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Abstract. In order to alleviate the burden of short keys, encrypting
a multiple times has been proposed. In the multiple encryption mode,
there may be encryptions under the same or different keys. There have
been several attacks against this encryption mode. When triple encryp-
tion is based on two keys, for instance, Merkle and Hellman proposed a
subtle meet-in-the-middle attack with a complexity similar to breaking a
single encryption, requiring nearly all the codebook. In the case of triple
encryption with three keys, Kelsey, Schneier, and Wagner proposed a
related-key attack with complexity similar to breaking a single encryp-
tion.
In this paper, we propose a new related-key attack against triple encryp-
tion which compares to breaking single encryption in the two aforemen-
tioned cases. Based on finding fixed points in a decrypt-encrypt sequence,
we propose a related-key attack against a two-key triple encryption. Our
attack has exactly the same performance as a meet-in-the-middle on
double encryption. When considering two keys, it is comparable to the
Merkle-Hellman attack, except that uses related keys. And, when con-
sidering three keys, it has a higher complexity than the Kelsey-Schneier-
Wagner attack, but has the advantage that it can live with known plain-
texts.
1 Introduction
A classical security model for symmetric encryption is the key recovery under
chosen plaintext or ciphertext attacks. Since ciphers are inevitably broken by
generic attacks such as exhaustive search, we use these attacks as reference and
hope that their complexity is the minimal cost for breaking the cipher. Indeed,
a cipher is secure if there is no attack better than exhaustive search, i.e., if its
complexity is lower than 2`, where ` is the key length.
In the 90’s, Biham and Knudsen [4, 3, 10] proposed the notion of related-key
attacks in which an adversary can impose to change the secret key following
some chosen relation ϕ. Related-key attacks open a way to new generic attacks
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such as the ones by Biham [5]. Therefore, exhaustive search may no longer be
the reference for assessing the security of a cipher.
As an example of a related-key attack, Kelsey, Schneier, and Wagner [9]
presented an attack against three-key triple encryption which shows that it is
not more secure than single encryption.
Notations. In this paper, KP, BKP, CP, and CC denote known plaintexts, broad-
cast known plaintexts, chosen plaintexts, and chosen ciphertexts, respectively.
In the BKP model, the adversary obtains a random plaintext and its encryption
under different keys. In addition, RK denotes the related-key model where the
adversary either knows or chooses the relation between the unknown keys. On
the other hand, dKP, dBKP, and dCP, dCC denote respective data complexities of
KP, BKP, CP, and CC attacks and CK and C
−1
K denote block cipher encryp-
tion and decryption under K, respectively. Furthermore, E(X) denotes expected
value of a random variable X and #L denotes the cardinality of a set L, and ⊕
denotes exclusive or.
Related work on Triple-DES. As far as we know, the only related-key attacks
against Triple-DES are the generic attack of Biham, the Kelsey-Schneier-Wagner
attack, and an attack of Phan [5, 9, 12]. There are other attacks using no related
keys such as attacks based on meet-in-the-middle by Merkle and Hellman, known
plaintext variants by Van Oorschot and Wiener, and a nice optimization by Lucks
[1, 11, 13, 14]. We use the table of Phan [12] given in Table 1 to compare these
attacks with ours. Note that the results are given in sightly different units, that
is, our time complexities are measured in terms of triple encryption instead of
single encryption; our memory complexities are measured in bits instead of 32-
bit words; our number of keys include the target one and not only the related
ones. The aforementioned attacks will be discussed in this paper.
Our contribution. In this paper, we first formalize the various ways to compare
the complexity of related-key attacks. Following a full-cost model, an attack is
significant if tm/p < 2`, where r is the number of related keys, t (resp. m) is
the time (resp. memory) complexity, and p is the probability of success. In a
more conservative approach, we shall compare max (t/p,m) with 2`/2. We can
also consider comparison in a restricted attack model in order to limit some
characteristics such as the number of related keys.
We then present a new attack on triple encryption which is based on the
discovery of fixed points for the mapping
x 7→ EncK ◦ Enc−1ϕ(K),
for some relation ϕ. This discovery requires the entire codebook in a Broadcast
Known Plaintext (BKP) attack for EncK and Encϕ(K) which makes our data
complexity high. Once we have a (good) fixed point, our attack becomes similar
to a standard meet-in-the-middle attack. Hence, it has a pretty low complexity.
Finally, we show that our attack has a comparable complexity to the best ones
so far. In the two-key case, it becomes the best known-plaintext attack. In the
sequel, we discuss the comparison of related-key attacks in different models.
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Table 1. Summary of attacks against Triple-DES.
parameters complexity
target data memory time #keys Cconservative reference
Two-Key Triple-DES 2 (KP) 27 2112 1 2112 exhaustive
search
256 (CP) 262 256 256 262 [5] (generic)
256 (KP) 258 2112 1 2112 [13, 14]
233 (KP) 291.5 286 2 291.5 [12]
265 (KP) 272 256 2 272 this paper
265 (BKP) 263 256 2 266 this paper
264 (KP) 264 256 1 264 [1] variant
256 (CP) 263 256 1 263 [1]
Three-Key Triple-DES 3 (KP) 28 2168 1 2168 exhaustive
search
284 (CP) 292 284 284 292 [5] (generic)
232 (KP) 290 2104 1 2104 [11]
3 (CP) 258 2110 1 2110 [1]
233 (KP) 235 286 2 286 [12]
267 (KP) 272 257 6 272 this paper
267 (BKP) 263 257 6 267 this paper
2 (BKP) 258 254 2 258 [9]
2 Comparing Related-Key Attacks
Given a dedicated attack against a cipher, it is common to compare it with
exhaustive search and declare the cipher broken if the attack is more efficient.
However, it is unfair to do this, since the attack model may already have better
generic attacks than exhaustive search. More expilicitly, we should consider other
generic attacks in the attack model while comparing the efficiency of the given
attack.
As an example, Biham’s generic attack [5] applies standard time-memory
tradeoffs in the related-key model. His attack consists of collecting yi = EncKi(x)
for a fixed plaintext x and r related keys Ki, 1 ≤ i ≤ r. Hence, we use r
chosen plaintexts. Then, it builds a dictionary (yi, i) and runs a multi-target
key recovery to find one key K such that EncK(x) is in the dictionary. With t
attempts, the probability of success is p = 1 − (1 − r2−`)t ≈ 1 − e−rt2−` . The
dictionary has size m = r(`+ log r) bits. For simplicity, we approximate m ≈ r.
In particular, for t = r = 2`/2, we have p ≈ 1 − e−1 ≈ 63%, so this is much
cheaper than exhaustive search.
The complexity of a related-key attack can be characterized by a multi-
dimensional vector consisting of
– the number of related keys r (the number of keys which are involved is r,
i.e., r = 1 if the attack uses no related keys);
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– the data complexity d (e.g., the number of chosen plaintexts), where we
may distinguish known plaintexts (KP), broadcast known plaintexts (BKP),
chosen plaintexts (CP), and chosen ciphertexts (CC) as they may be subject
to different costs in the attack model;
– the time complexity of the adversary t, where we may distinguish the pre-
computation complexity and the online running time complexity;
– the memory complexity m, which we may further distinguish quick-access,
or slow-access memory, read/write memory or read-only memory; and
– the probability of success p.
There are many other possible refinements. We can compare attacks by using
the partial ordering p on vectors (r, d, t,m, 1/p), i.e.,
(r, d, t,m, p) ≤p (r′, d′, t′,m′, p′)
m
r ≤ r′ and d ≤ d′ and t ≤ t′ and m ≤ m′ and p ≥ p′.
When a category such as the data complexity d has a sub-characterization
(dKP, dBKP, dCP, dCC), then d ≤ d′ implies another partial ordering on these sub-
characteristics.
We can say that an attack is insignificant if there is a generic attack with a
lower complexity vector. Since it is not always possible to compare two multi-
dimensional vectors, whether an attack is significant or not is not always clear.
Therefore, it is quite common to extend the partial ordering ≤p using different
models which are discussed below.
Conservative model. Traditionally, t, m, and p are combined into a “complexity”
which is arbitrarily measured by max (t/p,m). We could equivalently adopt t/p+
m since these operations yield the same orders of magnitude.
The idea behind this arbitrary notion is that we can normalize the success
probability p by using 1/p sessions of the attack. So, t has a factor 1/p corre-
sponding to 1/p different sessions. Clearly, the running time of every session adds
up whereas their memory complexity does not. If we make no special treatment
for r and d, we can just extend this simple notion by adding them in the time
complexity t (since the adversary must at least read the received data). We can,
thus, replace t by max(r, d, t). This leads us to
Cconservative(r, d, t,m, p) = max
(
r
p
,
d
p
,
t
p
,m
)
.
For instance, 2`/2 is the complexity of the Biham attacks [5].1
In some cases, there may be a special treatment for r and d though, espe-
cially regarding the 1/p factor. Actually, the current 1/p factor corresponds to
1 Strictly speaking, we shall have a 1/p factor corresponding to p = 63%, but this
would give the same order of magnitude and this simple formula aims at comparing
orders of magnitude.
A Related-Key Attack against Multiple Encryption based on Fixed Points 5
the worst case where iterating an attack requires new related keys. In many
cases, related keys could just be reused, which means that the total number of
related keys may be r instead of r/p. Therefore, we can keep this in mind that
the Cconservative formula may not be well adapted to attacks with a probability
of success far from 1. We should rather normalize the attack using the most
appropriate technique before applying the formula on the normalized attack.
This kind of rule of the thumb is rather convenient because two attacks can
always be compared by Cconservative: let
(r, d, t,m, p) ≤conservative (r′, d′, t′,m′, p′)
m
Cconservative(r, d, t,m, p) ≤ Cconservative(r′, d′, t′,m′, p′).
This defines a total ordering. An attack is said conservative-significant if it is
better than generic ones following the conservative ordering. That is, an attack
is conservative-significant if and only if
Cconservative(r, d, t,m, p) < 2
`
2 .
Limited related-key models. Arguably, related keys (or even chosen plaintexts
or ciphertexts) are harder to obtain, compared to the time spent in the attack.
More explicitly, getting encryption or decryption of the data under different
related keys that are chosen by the adversary requires much more work than
doing computations in the attack. For instance, an attack with complexity 23`/4,
r = 1, and d = 1 is declared not significant with ≤conservative because of the
Biham attack [5] with complexity 2`/2, which is a bit unfair. Therefore, we could
either go back to some partial ordering or to some attack model restrictions.
For example, a common model (when we do not care about related-key attacks)
consists of limiting to r = 1. A natural model would consist of limiting r ≤ Br,
for some bound Br. Finally, we can compare an attack with the best generic one
using not more related keys than the attack has. That is, we say that an attack
is conservative-significant in the RK-limited model, if its conservative complexity
is better than the one for all generic attacks using less number of related keys
than the attack has. If (r, d, t,m, p) is the complexity vector of the attack, we
shall compare Cconservative(r, d, t,m, p) with the one of (r
′, r′, t′, r′, 1 − e−r′t′2−`)
for all t′ and r′ ≤ r. Clearly, the minimal complexity is reached for r′ = r and
t′ = 2`/r′. So, the attack is conservative-significant in the RK-limited model if
Cconservative(r, d, t,m, p) <
2`
r
·
Other limited models. We may also consider other limited models. For instance,
we can restrict ourselves to attacks using known plaintexts only. All combinations
of limitations can be imagined. The relevance of these limited models shall be
driven by significance for applications.
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Full-cost model. Wiener [16] introduced the full cost expressed as O(t+ tm/c+
t
√
cρ3), where c is the number of processors and ρ is the rate of access to the
memory of all processors per time unit. (We assume here that parameters are
normalized so that we can assume p = 1.) Using a single processor and ρ = 1,
this simplifies to O(tm). Again, we replace t by max(r, d, t) to integrate r and
d. Therefore, we define the full cost as
Cfull(r, d, t,m, p) = max(r, d, t)
m
p
, (1)
and define
(r, d, t,m, p) ≤full (r′, d′, t′,m′, p′)
m
Cfull(r, d, t,m, p) ≤ Cfull(r′, d′, t′,m′, p′).
The total ordering which takes parallelism tricks into account is a bit more
complicated. Without using any parallelism trick, Biham’s generic attacks have
d = r, t = 2`/r, and m = r. Hence, their full cost is max(r2, 2`). Again, this is
relevant for r ≤ 2`/2 only and the full cost is 2`, no matter what the value of r
is. In this case, exhaustive search with r = 2` has the same full cost. An attack
is full-significant if and only if
Cfull(r, d, t,m, p) < 2
`.
As a rule of thumb, we could adopt the simple criterion tm/p < 2`.
Note that Equation (1) only gives an upper bound on the full cost which
can be pessimistic. For instance, it was shown that meet-in-the-middle [8] with
a key of size `k has a full cost of 2
4`k/3 and may also be reduced to 26`k/5 using
parallelism [16]. So, the comparison based on full cost shall be done with great
care.
As an application, we can look at recent attacks on AES working with p = 1.
(See Table 2.) As we can see, the Biryukov-Khovratovich attack [6] on AES-192 is
only conservative-significant in the RK-limited model, thanks to the low number
of related keys, but it is not conservative-significant. The Biryukov-Khovratovich-
Nikolic´ attack [7] on AES-256 is conservative-significant in the RK-limited model,
thanks to the low number of related keys, but it is not conservative-significant.
The Biryukov-Khovratovich attack [6] on AES-256 is significant for both criteria.
3 Semi-Generic Related-Key Attacks against Triple-DES
We propose here a related-key attack against Triple-DES. For the three-key
triple encryption case, this attack is semi-generic in the sense that it does not
depend on DES, but only on the structure of triple encryption which is used
in Triple-DES, that is, the encrypt-decrypt-encrypt structure. For the two-key
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Table 2. Attacks on AES
parameters complexity significance
target data memory time #keys Cconservative conservative RK-limited reference
AES-128 1 1 2128 1 2128 exhaustive search
AES-192 1 1 2192 1 2192 exhaustive search
4 4 2190 4 2190 [5]
296 296 296 296 296 [5]
2123 2152 2176 4 2176 no yes [6]
AES-256 1 1 2256 1 2256 exhaustive search
4 4 2254 4 2254 [5]
235 235 2221 235 2221 [5]
2128 2128 2128 2128 2128 [5]
2131 265 2131 235 2131 no yes [7]
2100 277 2100 4 2100 yes yes [6]
case, it is generic since it also works for the encrypt-encrypt-encrypt structure.
The three-key and the two-key triple encryptions defined by
EncK1,K2,K3 = CK1 ◦ C−1K2 ◦ CK3 , and
EncK1,K2 = CK1 ◦ C−1K2 ◦ CK1 .
We denote by `k the length of the Ki subkeys and by `m the block length. We
also consider the two-key triple encryption with the encrypt-encrypt-encrypt
structure, i.e., Enc′K1,K2 = CK1 ◦ CK2 ◦ CK1 .
3.1 Preliminaries
We will give some necessary background regarding random permutations without
providing their proofs due to the space limitation.
Definition 1. Let pi be a permutation over a finite set S. The k-cycles of pi is
(c1, c2, . . . , ck) such that pi(ci) = ci+1 for i = 1, . . . , k − 1 and pi(ck) = c1.
For example, when k = 1, it is a 1-cycle, i.e., pi(c) = c and c is also called a fixed
point. When k = 2, it is 2-cycles such that pi(c1) = c2 and pi(c2) = c1.
Lemma 2. Let pi be a permutation over a finite set S. The probability of having
exactly t k-cycles is e−1/k/ktt! when the cardinality of S grows to infinity.
For instance, the probability of having no fixed points is e−1 which is computed
by substituting t = 0 and k = 1. On the other hand, given a random permutation,
the expected number of fixed points (1-cycles) is 1. Additionally, the expected
number of 2-cycles is 1/2. This is generalized in the following lemma.
Lemma 3. Let pi be a permutation over a finite set S. The expected number
k-cycles tends towards 1/k as the cardinality of S grows to infinity.
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3.2 Three-Key Triple Encryption Case
We use the relation ϕ(K1,K2,K3) = (K2,K1,K3). We observe that for K =
(K1,K2,K3), we have
EncK ◦ Enc−1ϕ(K) =
(
CK1 ◦ C−1K2
)2
. (2)
The idea of the attack consists of looking for a plaintext x such that EncK(x) =
Encϕ(K)(x). By enumerating the codebook we can find one such x with complex-
ity 2`m . Indeed, this would be a fixed point for the above permutation.
Under heuristic assumptions, the permutation CK1 ◦ C−1K2 has a number of
fixed points such that E(a) = 1 and b number of 2-cycles such that E(b) = 1/2.
Since,
(
CK1 ◦ C−1K2
)2
is a composition of CK1 ◦C−1K2 with itself, the a fixed points
of CK1 ◦C−1K2 are the fixed points of
(
CK1 ◦ C−1K2
)2
, too. However, the elements of
2-cycles of CK1 ◦C−1K2 become fixed points for
(
CK1 ◦ C−1K2
)2
, as well. So, we have
a+2b fixed points. In the attack, we take advantage of fixed points of CK1 ◦C−1K2 .
Hence, we call the fixed points of
(
CK1 ◦ C−1K2
)2
which is also the fixed points of
CK1 ◦C−1K2 as good fixed points and the elements of 2-cycles of CK1 ◦C−1K2 as bad
fixed points.
1: select c1 = 0 and c2, . . . , cn at random
2: for i = 1 to n do
3: set a list Li to the empty list
4: repeat
5: get a new BKP x with keys K ⊕ ci and ϕ(K ⊕ ci)
6: let y (resp. z) be the encryption of x under key K ⊕ ci (resp. ϕ(K ⊕ ci))
7: if y = z then
8: add y in list Li
9: end if
10: until all x cover the entire codebook
11: end for
12: set I to the set of all i such that #Li > 0
Fig. 1. Attack on Triple Encryption (First Part — Broadcast Known Plaintext)
The attack is composed of two parts, namely, the fixed points finding part
and the key recovery part. Our attack starts as shown in Fig. 1 or in Fig. 2
depending on the type of the data set (BKP or KP). In the BKP variant, we
first determine the relation between related key pairs as c1 = 0 and c2, . . . , cn, at
random. Then, for each i we have a list Li of fixed points for
(
CK1(i) ◦ C−1K2(i)
)2
by enumerating the codebook. If the cardinality #Li of Li is nonzero, then we
keep the index i of Li in I. Note that, if Li has an odd number of terms, we
ensure that there is at least one fixed point for CK1(i) ◦ C−1K2(i) in it.
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1: select c1 = 0 and c2, . . . , cn at random
2: for i = 1 to n do
3: set a list Li to the empty list
4: dump the entire codebook for key K ⊕ ci (EncK⊕ci(x) stored at address h(x))
5: repeat
6: get a new KP x with key ϕ(K ⊕ ci)
7: let z be the encryption of x under key ϕ(K ⊕ ci)
8: let y to the content of cell h(x)
9: if y = z then
10: add y in list Li
11: end if
12: until all x cover the entire codebook
13: end for
14: set I to the set of all i such that #Li > 0
Fig. 2. Attack on Triple Encryption (First Part — Known Plaintext)
Then, the attack continues as shown in Fig. 3. Starting from the first i in
I, we pick every fixed point x from the list Li and enumerate all `k-bit keys
and find pairs (K1,K2) such that CK1(x) = CK2(x) with complexity 2
`k using a
meet-in-the-middle algorithm. Then, for each remaining j in I, we keep counter
c in order to determine whether (K1,K2) suggested by the meet-in-the-middle
algorithm is right key pair or not. Notice that the correct (K1,K2) pair is always
suggested if x is a good fixed point. Other pairs are called wrong pairs. In order
to eliminate wrong pairs, we use the list of other fixed points by checking whether
CK1(j)(y) = CK2(j)(y) or not, where K1(j) = K1 ⊕ cj and K2(j) = K2 ⊕ cj . If
there exists such y, then we increment c by 1. Otherwise, if there is no such y
and #Li is odd, then we decide that this x is not a good fixed point. In addition,
we make another list R to keep promising key pairs which have nonzero counter,
namely, (K1,K2, c) and c 6= 0. Finally, we make exhaustive search on K3 with
the promising key pairs (K1,K2) existing in the list R. If there is no true K3,
we can make several iterations of this method until going through all lists with
non-zero cardinality.
Success Probability. Our attack succeeds when there is one related key pair
having at least one good fixed point, i.e., a > 0. From Lemma 2, for a random
permutation, the probability of having no fixed point is e−1. Therefore, the
attack fails when there is no good fixed point for each related key pair which
happens with probability e−n. Hence, the success probability of the attack is
p = 1− e−n.
Complexity Analysis. In order to generate fixed points in Fig. 1, we use r = 2n
related keys, d = n2`m+1 broadcast known plaintexts, and negligible time and
memory. For the known plaintext variant depicted in Fig. 2, data complexity
is the same as the BKP variant, but the memory complexity is higher, i.e.,
m = `m2
`m .
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1: sort I in increasing order with first the list of i’s with #Li odd then the remaining
ones
2: while I is not empty do
3: pick the first i ∈ I and remove it from I
4: for all x in Li do
5: initialize a hash table H and a list R
6: for all K1(i) do
7: store (CK1(i)(x),K1(i)) in H
8: end for
9: for all K2(i) do
10: for each K1(i) such that (CK2(i)(x),K1(i)) ∈ H do
11: compute K1 and K2 from K1(i) and K2(i) using ci and set c = 0
12: for each j ∈ I do
13: compute K1(j) and K2(j) from K1 and K2 using cj
14: look if there is y ∈ Lj such that CK1(j)(y) = CK2(j)(y)
15: if there is such y then
16: increment c
17: end if
18: if there is no such y and #Lj is odd then
19: exit the j loop and set c to 0
20: end if
21: end for
22: if c 6= 0, add (K1,K2, c) in list R sorted by decreasing c
23: end for
24: end for
25: end for
26: for each (K1,K2, c) ∈ R sorted by c do
27: for all K3 do
28: if (K1,K2,K3) consistent with data then
29: yield (K1,K2,K3) and exit
30: end if
31: end for
32: end for
33: end while
34: attack failed
Fig. 3. Attack on Three-Key Triple Encryption (Second Part)
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The loop in K1(i) takes t = 2
`k/3 triple encryptions and m = (`m + `k)2
`k
bits of memory. The loop in K2(i) essentially takes t = 2
`k/3 triple encryptions
(the inner loop in the found K2(i) is negligible).
The loop in (K1,K2, c) depends on the size of R. We denote Rn the expected
number of remaining wrong keys in R using parameter n. Let n∗ − 1 be the
number of other lists which have an odd number of fixed points. We have 22`k
potential pairs, but an equation to satisfy on n∗`m bits to end up in R. So, we
have Rn ≈ 22`k−n∗`m . We have
E(n∗) = 1 + (n− 1)
∑
a odd
e−1
a!
= 1 +
(n− 1)(1− e−2)
2
, (3)
where
∑
a odd 1/a! = (e − e−1)/2. Then, we have E(n∗) ≈ 0.4323 × n + 0.5677.
So, this loop takes t = (1 +Rn)2
`k/3 triple encryptions for a good fixed point
and t = Rn2
`k/3 for a bad one. In what follows, we adjust n so that Rn ≈ 0.
Namely, for n = 6`k/`m, we have Rn ≈ 2−0.4`k−0.6`m so we can neglect wrong
pairs.
The main loop and the x loop iterate until it takes a good fixed point. For
each Li, we have exactly t k-cycles with probability e
−1/k/ktt!. Let us assume
that the probabilities for k = 1 and k = 2 are independent. For instance, the
best case is a > 1 (some good fixed points) and b = 0 (no bad fixed points) with
probability e−1/2(1−e−1) ≈ 0.38. Let Nn (resp. N∗n) denote the expected number
of iterations of the i and x loops (resp. in the case that the attack succeeds). In
the case of failure (a = 0), we have 2b iterations, hence, the expected number
of bad fixed point is 1 for each list That is, since there are n lists, the expected
number of iterations before the attack fails is n. This happens with probability
e−n, therefore, we have
N∗n =
Nn − ne−n
1− e−n ·
Let (ai, bi) be the numbers of 1-cycles and 2-cycles in the lists in I, respec-
tively, where i is at most n. Regarding the first list, for a1 nonzero good fixed
points and 2b1 bad ones, the expected number of iterations is
Nn(a1, b1) =
1(
a1+2b1
a1
) 2b1+1∑
i=1
i
(
a1 + 2b1 − i
a1 − 1
)
,
which does not depend on n.
Notice that for a1 = 0, it is Nn(0, b1) = 2b1 + N¯n−1, where N¯n−1 is the ex-
pected number of iterations conditioned to that all ai’s are even. This is because,
we first consider the lists having odd number of ai’s in the algorithm. Therefore,
if a1 = 0, then the remaining lists will contain even number of ai’s. Hence, we
will continue searching points in the remaining lists with all bad points of the
first list. Furthermore, we have
Nn =
∑
a1, b1
Nn(a1, b1) Pr[a1, b1].
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Here, we compute the joint probability Pr[a1, b1] as
Pr[a1, b1] = Pr[a1, b1|a1 odd] Pr[a1 odd] + Pr[a1, b1|a1 even] Pr[a1 even].
Then, the probability that a1 is even is computed as
Pr[a1 even] = Pr[a1, . . . , an even] =
(∑
i
e−1
(2i)!
)n
=
(
1 + e−2
2
)n
·
We can equivalently write the probability that a1 is odd as
Pr[a1 odd] = 1− Pr[a1 even] = 1−
(
1 + e−2
2
)n
·
On the other hand, for a1 odd, we have
Pr[a1, b1|a1 odd] =
e−
3
2
a1!2b1b1!∑
i odd
e−1
i!
=
2
a1!2b1b1!(e
3
2 − e− 12 ) ·
For a1 even, we get
Pr[a1, b1|a1 even] =
e−
3
2
a1!2b1b1!∑
i even
e−1
i!
=
2
a1!2b1b1!(e
3
2 + e−
1
2 )
·
Hence, we get
Pr[a1, b1] =

2
(
1−
(
1+e−2
2
)n)
a1!2b1b1!(e
3
2−e− 12 )
, if a1 odd,
2
(
1+e−2
2
)n
a1!2b1b1!(e
3
2+e−
1
2 )
, if a1 even.
Now, we compute N¯n−1 as
N¯n−1 =
∑
a1 even
b1
Nn−1(a1, b1) Pr[a1, b1|a1 even] =
∑
a1 even
b1
2Nn−1(a1, b1)
a1!2b1b1!(e
3
2 + e−
1
2 )
·
Afterwards, Nn by substituting Nn(0, b1) = 2b1 + N¯n−1 as
Nn =
∑
a1=0
b1
(2b1 + N¯n−1) Pr[0, b1] +
∑
a1>0
b1
Nn(a1, b1) Pr[a1, b1]
=
2(N¯n−1 + 1)
(e+ e−1)
(1 + e−2
2
)n
+
∑
a1>0 even
b1
2Nn(a1, b1)
a1!2b1b1!(e
3
2 + e−
1
2 )
(1 + e−2
2
)n
+
∑
a1>0 odd
b1
2Nn(a1, b1)
a1!2b1b1!(e
3
2 − e− 12 )
(
1−
(1 + e−2
2
)n)
.
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We compute some values of N¯n, Nn, and N
∗
n in Table 3. As we see from
this table, the number of iterations is upper bounded by 2 in any success case.
Finally, the total complexity is
r = 2n,
d = n2`m+1,
t =
{
2
(
2
32
`k + 132
`kRn
)
+ 132
`k if success, and
n
(
2
32
`k + 132
`kRn
)
if failure,
m =
{
(`m + `k)2
`k for BKP variant, and
max(`m2
`m , (`m + `k)2
`k) for KP variant,
p = 1− e−n.
In general, we suggest n ≈ 6`k/`m to get t = 5× 2`k/3 in a success case.
Table 3. Some values for N¯n, Nn, and N
∗
n
n 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 50 100
N¯n 2.613 4.306 1.908 5.403 6.115 6.576 6.874 7.068 7.193 7.275 7.424 7.424
Nn 1.264 1.895 1.908 1.789 1.675 1.593 1.540 1.507 1.488 1.477 1.462 1.462
N∗n 1.418 1.879 1.851 1.748 1.652 1.582 1.535 1.505 1.487 1.476 1.462 1.462
In the case of DES, we have `k = 56 and `m = 64. We take n = 3 to get
n∗ ≈ 1.865 and Rn ≈ 2−7.338. So, we use r = 6 keys. We use d = 267 chosen
plaintexts or ciphertexts, or known plaintexts. The time complexity is t = 257
triple encryptions in all cases. The memory complexity is m = 263 bits in the
chosen message variant and m = 272 in the known plaintext variant. The key
to recover has 168 bits. The attack succeeds with probability p = 95%. Note
that this attack is better than the generic related-key attack using tradeoffs.
It works in the ideal cipher model. Bellare and Rogaway [2] proved that the
best (non-related-key) generic attack in the ideal cipher model would require at
least 278 encryptions. This example shows that the result no longer holds in the
related-key model.
If we would like to use the triple AES encryption, we obtain different results
which are summarized in Table 4.
Comparison with the Kelsey-Schneier-Wagner attack. Kelsey, Schneier, and Wag-
ner presented a related-key attack against three-key triple encryption which has
similar performances [9]. It consists in using
ϕ(K1,K2,K3) = (K1 ⊕∆,K2,K3).
Then, EncK ◦ Enc−1ϕ(K) = CK1 ◦ C−1K1⊕∆ which only depends on K1. Hence, ex-
haustive search can recover K1. For DES, this attack has r = 2, d = 2 (known
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and chosen plaintexts), t = 256 encryptions, m = 256 bits, and p = 100%. So, it
is better than our attack. Contrary to ours, it has no extension to two-key triple
encryption. However, this attack extends to the encrypt-encrypt-encrypt triple
encryption mode whereas our attack is restricted to the encrypt-decrypt-encrypt
construction.
Note that getting EncK ◦ Enc−1ϕ(K)(y) = z on a random y is equivalent to
getting EncK(x) = y and Encϕ(K)(x) = z on a random x. So, this attack is in
the BKP model.
Comparison with the Phan attack. In the category of known plaintext attacks,
Phan [12] uses
ϕ(K1,K2,K3) = (K1,K3,K2)
(which is similar to our relation) and a slide attack. It breaks the three-key triple
encryption using r = 2, d = 233 (known and chosen plaintexts), t = 288/3 triple
encryptions, and m = 238 bits. This attack extends to the encrypt-encrypt-
encrypt case and to the two-key triple encryption (with a memory complexity
inflated to m = 294.5 bits). Our known plaintext attack uses a quite lower time
complexity, but a higher number of chosen plaintexts.
3.3 Two-Key Triple Encryption Case
We use the relation ϕ(K1,K2) = (K2,K1). We observe that for K = (K1,K2),
we have
EncK ◦ Enc−1ϕ(K) =
(
CK1 ◦ C−1K2
)3
.
Fixed points of EncK ◦ Enc−1ϕ(K) are either the fixed points of CK1 ◦ C−1K2 or
the points in 3-cycles. We just proceed as in the previous attack. The proba-
bility to have a fixed points and b cycles of length 3 is e−4/3/a!3bb! (Lemma
2), and, E(a) = 1 and E(b) = 1/3 (Lemma 3). The number of values x such
that
(
CK1 ◦ C−1K2
)3
(x) = x is a+ 3b. As in the previous attack, a fixed point of(
CK1 ◦ C−1K2
)3
is good if it is also a fixed point of CK1 ◦ C−1K2 . Notice that if the
number of fixed points (a+ 3b) is not a multiple of 3, then we certainly have a
good fixed point.
The final complexity is very similar to the three-key encryption case. The
difference is that we no longer need an exhaustive search on K3 and wrong
(K1,K2) pairs are discarded by a simple consistency check. We can work with
n = 1 and p = 63%.
Let ai and bi the number of 1-cycle and 3-cycles in the list Li whose index
i is in I. Similar to the previous attack, given a1 good fixed points and b1 bad
ones of the first list, we have
Nn(a1, b1) =
1(
a1+3b1
a1
) 3b1+1∑
i=1
i
(
a1 + 3b1 − i
a1 − 1
)
.
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In addition, we observe that Nn(0, b1) = 3b1 + N¯n−1, where N¯n−1 denotes
the expected number of iterations conditioned to that all ai’s are multiples of 3.
As in the previous attack, we have
Nn =
∑
a1,b1
Nn(a1, b1) Pr[a1, b1] and N
∗
n =
Nn − ne−n
1− e−n ,
and we write the joint probability Pr[a1, b1] as
Pr[a1, b1] =

3
(
1−
(
1+2e
− 3
2 cos
√
3
2
3
)n)
2a1!3b1b1!
(
e
4
3−e− 16 cos
√
3
2
) , if a1 not a multiple of 3,
e−
4
3
(
1+2e
− 3
2 cos
√
3
2
3
)n−1
a1!3b1b1!
, if a1 a multiple of 3.
Similarly, we compute N¯n−1 as
N¯n−1 =
∑
a1 a multiple of 3
b1
Nn−1(a1, b1) Pr[a1, b1|a1 a multiple of 3 ].
By noticing that Nn−1(0, b1) = 3b1 + N¯n−2, we compute some values of N¯n,
Nn, and N
∗
n and obtain identical results with the previous attack. Therefore, the
complexity of this attack is
r = 2n,
d = n2`m+1,
t =
{
4
32
`k if success, and
2n
3 2
`k if failure,
m =
{
(`m + `k)2
`k for BKP variant, and
max(`m2
`m , (`m + `k)2
`k) for KP variant,
p = 1− e−n.
While the first part of the algorithm works like in the three-key case with two
variants in Fig. 1 and Fig. 2, the second part of the algorithm is shown in Fig. 4.
In the case of DES, we take n = 1, so r = 2. We use d = 265 chosen
plaintexts or ciphertexts. The time complexity is t = 256 triple encryptions in
all the cases. The memory complexity is m = 263 bits and the key to recover has
112 bits. The known plaintext variant uses d = 265 known plaintexts and the
memory complexity becomes m = 272 bits. The attack succeeds with probability
p = 63%. Comparison with other attacks is presented in Table 1.
Comparison with the Merkle-Hellman meet-in-the-middle attack. Merkle and
Hellman proposed to use a simple collision algorithm to find collisions between
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1: sort I in increasing order with first the list of i’s with #Li not a multiple of 3 then
the remaining ones
2: while I is not empty do
3: pick the first i ∈ I and remove it from I
4: for all x in Li do
5: initialize a hash table H
6: for all K1(i) do
7: store (CK1(i)(x),K1(i)) in H
8: end for
9: for all K2(i) do
10: for each K1(i) such that (CK2(i)(x),K1(i)) ∈ H do
11: compute K1 and K2 from K1(i) and K2(i) using ci
12: if (K1,K2,K1) consistent with data then
13: yield (K1,K2,K1) and exit
14: end if
15: end for
16: end for
17: end for
18: end while
19: attack failed
Fig. 4. Attack on Two-Key Triple Encryption (Second Part)
Table 4. Semi-Generic Attack against Triple Encryption (Chosen Message Variant)
two-key three-key
cipher DES AES128 AES192 AES256 DES AES128 AES192 AES256
key size 116 256 384 512 168 384 576 768
`k 56 128 192 256 56 128 192 256
`m 64 128 128 128 64 128 128 128
#keys 2 2 2 2 6 8 14 18
#chosen plaintexts 265 2129 2129 2129 267 2131 2132 2132
time complexity 256 2128 2192 2256 257 2129 2193 2257
memory complexity 263 2136 2200 2255 263 2136 2200 2265
success probability 63% 63% 63% 63% 95% 98% 100% 100%
Cconservative 2
66 2136 2200 2265 267 2136 2200 2265
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the list of all C−1K2 (0) and the list of all C
−1
K1
(Enc(C−1K1 (0))) [1]. This requires to en-
crypt all chosen plaintexts C−1K1 (0). A variant with known plaintexts only can be
done as follows: first we make a dictionary of all (CK1(0),K1) in addition to the
dictionary of all (C−1K2 (0),K2). Then, every time we receive a plaintext/ciphertext
pair (x, y), we look if x is in the first dictionary to find K1. If it is, we compute
z = C−1K1 (y) and get a new element C
−1
K1
(Enc(C−1K1 (0))) = z. We can look for z
in the second dictionary. This doubles the memory complexity and increases the
data complexity to essentially the entire codebook.
This attack has lower complexity parameters than ours for the chosen plain-
text variant. The known plaintext variants are equivalent (except that we use
related keys and the Merkle-Hellman attack does not).
Note that our attack can be extended to the encrypt-encrypt-encrypt case in
a way that for K = (K1,K2) and the relation ϕ(K1,K2) = (K2,K1), we have
EncK ◦ Encϕ(K) = (CK1 ◦ CK2)3 ,
which allows us to attack against two-key triple encryption by using the similar
way with the encrypt-decrypt-encrypt case.
4 Conclusion
We presented a new attack on triple encryption which uses related keys. It can
use chosen messages or known plaintexts, but requires the entire codebook for
related keys. Our attack is the best in the known plaintext attack category in the
three-key case. Besides, the best attacks remain the Merkle-Hellman attack [1] in
the two-key case and the Kelsey-Schneier-Wagner attack [9] in the three-key case.
In addition to the attacks on triple encryption, we formalize the various ways
to compare the complexity of related-key attacks and apply it to the recently
proposed attacks on AES.
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